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Matthew Williams – What role has the language of legislation played in changes to 
the constitutional role of senior judges in British politics since 1960? 
 
Lord Atkin quoting Alice Through the Looking Glass in Liversidge v Anderson [1942] 
AC 206 at 245, 
 
`When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, `…it means just 
what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less.' 
`The question is,' said Alice, `whether you can make words mean so many different 
things.' 
`The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, `which is to be master - that's all.' 
 
Abstract 
Some judges are born political, some seek out political power, and others have politics thrust 
upon them. This paper aims to show that the latter is the true description of developments in the 
constitutional role of senior British judges since 1960. The paper will outline the ‘unintended 
politicisation of the judiciary thesis’ which seeks to explain the increased political power of judges as a 
product of the increased enactment of ambiguous legislation by successive governments. This paper 
therefore adopts a historic institutionalist perspective, in order to move away from traditional accounts 
that explain changes in the institutional balance of British politics as being caused by the personal 
political ambitions of the judges themselves. The hypothesis tested for this paper is that legislation has 
become more ambiguous since 1960. A new methodology was required to test this hypothesis, with the 
result being a discourse analysis that has been used to objectively measure the ambiguity of legislative 
sections for a sample of 1,335 sections between 1960 and 2005. Results show with 95% confidence 
that legislation has become more ambiguous since 1960, with the 1980s and the 2000s showing the 
highest numbers of ambiguous legislative sections, at the time when strong Commons majorities 
allowed the government to pass a greater volume of legislation. However the 1990s showed the highest 
proportionate levels of ambiguity when government was hamstrung by a small Commons majority, and 
more had to be achieved from less legislation. 
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Introduction 
 
The constitutional role of senior judges has changed a great deal since 1960, as 
their political power has increased relative to that of politicians and administrators. 
This paper is part of a larger doctoral project that aims to explain the increased 
political function played by the judiciary as primarily an unintended consequence of 
changes to the language of primary legislation over the last fifty years. The hypothesis 
to be tested is that the language of primary legislation has become increasingly 
ambiguous since 1960 and that this ambiguity means that the law cannot be 
objectively determined and therefore requires judicial clarification. Thus the political 
power of judges has emerged as an unintended consequence of changes to the nature 
and volume of primary legislation.  
This theory relies on the theoretical assumptions of historic institutionalism 
that emphasises the importance of gradual change, context, and indeterminacy as the 
key causal forces behind institutional change. The causal direction proposed is also 
significant. Many existing theories suggest that changes in the political power of 
judges came from the judiciary itself, whereas this paper aims to show that political 
power was thrust onto the judiciary as a result of changes to the exogenous political 
context. The key elements of this theory are, firstly the importance of institutional 
history over deliberate agency, and secondly the importance of change coming from 
the political institutions rather than from the judicial institutions. This theory is thus 
called – the unintended politicisation of the judiciary thesis.  
This choice of terminology is designed to mark the theory out from its rivals. 
The research problem of judicial power is commonly conceptualised in the 
comparative politics literature as the ‘judicialisation of politics’, defined as ‘the 
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expansion of the province of courts or the judges at the expense of the politicians and 
of the administrators’ 1 . This study will argue that senior British judges have, 
expanded their power to review the decisions of politicians and administrators, but 
they have done so in response to institutional rather than personal incentives. The 
primary institutional incentive of the judiciary is to maximise certainty in the rule of 
law, and such certainty has been threatened by ambiguous legislation. Politicians have 
enacted a greater volume of legislation which is constructed with decreasing 
specificity of language. This has had the unintended consequence of drawing judges 
into political decision-making as they must determine the interpretation and 
application of such ambiguous law. Thus the causal mechanism in the UK should not 
be conceptualised as the judicialisation of politics, as the judges have mostly been 
passively reacting to their political context.  
This paper will deal with the first half of this causal argument by 
concentrating on the independent variable – ambiguous legislation. Specifically the 
following hypothesis will be tested alongside a rival null hypothesis: 
  
H1 – The language of legislation has become increasingly ambiguous since 1960. 
H0 – The language of legislation has not changed since 1960. 
 
The hypothesis needs to be proved, and the null hypothesis rejected in order to 
make the case that the language of legislation has changed, and to go some way to 
explaining the changed constitutional role of senior judges in British politics. 
Evidence to prove the hypothesis has been taken from a discourse analysis that has 
been used to gather relevant information from sections of legislation over the last fifty 
                                               
1
 Tate C.N. & Vallinder T. (1995) The global expansion of judicial power (New York: New York 
University Press) p.13. 
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years. This information will reveal patterns in the language of legislation over time, 
and enable conclusions to be drawn regarding changes in legislative language. It is 
necessary first of all to clarify the meaning of key concepts that will be used 
throughout the paper. There will then be three main sections; the first discussing the 
theory in detail, the second outlining the discourse analysis methodology used to 
measure ambiguity in legislation, and the third section considering the results.  
Identifying the causation of changes to judicial power is very complicated, and 
there is a heavy reliance on theory as a result of the impossibility of directly observing 
the nexus of cause and effect. Furthermore, the field is located in an inter-disciplinary 
no-man’s land between politics, law, sociology and philosophy, and so clarity of 
conceptual definition is vital. The most important concepts to clarify are ‘ambiguous 
legislation’, and ‘political power of senior judges’.  
What is primary legislation and what makes it ‘ambiguous’? In this paper 
primary legislation refers to public statute law enacted by Parliament. This can be 
contrasted with private and hybrid acts, which are also passed by Parliament but are 
specific requests from private organisations. Statute law should also be dissociated 
from other sources of primary legislation, notably Measures of the General Synod of 
the Church of England.  
What does ‘ambiguous’ mean in reference to the language of legislation? This 
term is ironically incapable of objective interpretation, so a careful elucidation is 
crucial if we are to have any hope of objectively measuring it. This paper therefore 
relies on a conceptualisation of ‘ambiguous’ developed by March and Olsen, which 
has been defined as being any one of, or any combination of, the following four 
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components2. Firstly, ambiguous means plurality. In legislation this refers to semantic 
and syntactic forms that communicate more than one possible meaning. This is 
‘ambiguous’ in its most commonly used form.  Secondly, ambiguous means volatility. 
This is similar to plurality of meaning but refers more specifically to language that 
elicits a subjective response, in that its meaning depends totally on the individual 
interpreter. Plurality of meaning is unclear as to its meaning, whereas volatility is 
grammatically clear but its meaning depends on how an individual defines key terms. 
Thirdly, ambiguous means decentralisation.  In terms of legislation, decentralisation 
means there is uncertainty about who is responsible for the implementation of the law, 
and how much power they have been delegated. Finally, ambiguous means mobility. 
In statute law this signifies a law whose meaning is unstable in that it depends too 
much on context. Thus a small change in the facts can cause a significant change in 
the law. March and Olsen were using these four measures to analyse institutional 
change. Given that legislation is a collection of rules intended to accomplish 
institutional change, the application of the four measures to this project is arguably 
ideal, especially as they are measures that have been successfully tested in previous 
research. The key advantage of the measures is that they bring a clear and objective 
means of identifying ambiguity of legislative language. 
The other major concept, ‘political power of senior judges’, must also be 
clarified. Judicial decisions are political if they are discretionary, prospective, and 
consequentialist. The judges’ motivations for the resolution of a case would come 
from influences exogenous to the immediate concerns of the litigants to the case itself. 
Such motivations may be legal certainty, personal morality, socioeconomic necessity, 
or foreign jurisprudence. The most significant attribute of a political decision however 
                                               
2
 March JG and Olsen JP (1989) Rediscovering institutions: the organizational basis of politics 
(Oxford: Maxwell Macmillan). pp.42-3. 
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is discretion. This refers to the ability to select between a number of equally 
satisfactory resolutions to a single case3.  
As an example of a ‘political’ decision one can take the pre-Human Rights Act 
case R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms4 where the Lords 
decided that rules issued by the Home Secretary for a blanket ban against interviews 
between prisoners and journalists, potentially breached the latter’s basic right to 
investigating the soundness of their conviction. This decision was taken in a 
discretionary area of judgement and prospectively developed the right of all prisoners’ 
to access justice. The Prison Rules were arguably ‘ambiguous’ because their operation 
was authorised by a piece of legislation (the Prison Act 1952) that did not specifically 
authorise the denial of access to journalists, and the judges had to assume that without 
explicit authorisation, Parliament could not have intended this outcome. As per Lord 
Hoffmann at 412: 
 
Parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament can, if it chooses, legislate 
contrary to fundamental principles of human rights. The Human Rights Act 1998 will 
not detract from this power. The constraints upon its exercise by Parliament are 
ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality means that Parliament 
must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. Fundamental 
rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is 
too great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have 
passed unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or 
necessary implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the 
most general words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. 
In this way the courts of the United Kingdom, though acknowledging the sovereignty 
                                               
3
 See for example, Robertson D (1998) Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press). 
4
 [1999] 3 All ER 400. 
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of Parliament, apply principles of constitutionality little different from those which 
exist in countries where the power of the legislature is expressly limited by a 
constitutional document.’  
 
This case shows the judges using discretion to overrule the government. Such 
increased political power of judges is a hugely important change in the British 
constitution with implications for Parliamentary Sovereignty. If judges can make 
politically sensitive decisions they can potentially subvert the democratic role of 
Parliament and the government. This project argues that the development of a 
discretionary area of judgement has been caused not by judicial artifice but by the 
ambiguity of primary legislation. These ideas will be considered further in the 
following section on theory.   
 
I:  Theory 
 
The hypothesis is the product of the following theory. The ultimate political 
fact underpinning the British constitution is that Parliament has legislative supremacy5. 
This feature is the primary rule of recognition used by judges in order to interpret 
statutory language and determine the validity of actions taken under legislative 
authority6. H.L.A. Hart argued that legislation had, in his lifetime, become more prone 
to having ‘gaps’ which allowed a free judicial hand in deciding what to fill them with. 
This paper contends instead that legislation cannot have simple gaps – they are 
ambiguities. A ‘gap’ is nothingness, where an ‘ambiguity’ is something that creates 
confusion. Such confusion means that the supreme legal authority (Parliament) has 
issued a command that cannot be determined with certainty. This cannot be left 
                                               
5
 H.W.R Wade (1955) ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’ Cambridge Law Journal p.188 
6
 Hart H L A (1994) The Concept of Law 2nd ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press) 
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unresolved by the judges otherwise the intentions of the supreme legislature will be 
mistaken, which is fundamentally against the point of having a supreme legislative 
power. Thus judges must respond to and resolve any ambiguity. Even in situations 
where the ambiguity is literally a gap – or a casus omissus to use its legal term – this 
is still a potential source of confusion in the rule of law. It still creates an actual 
problem, despite its being literally nothing, because supreme legal authority cannot be 
delegated into a vacuum. If there are gaps, they are like black holes – we perceive that 
it is nothing when in reality it is a dense mass of potential uncertainty.  
What Lon Fuller described as natural law is, in the UK, an aspect of positive 
law. Namely you cannot have law that has no certain meaning and provides no 
unequivocal guidance as to acceptable behaviour 7 . In other countries, legislative 
ambiguities can be resolved by reference to a constitutional text or a Civil Code, but 
this is not possible in the UK. Parliament is the pinnacle of the constitution, so if its 
commands cannot be understood there is a real constitutional dilemma regarding the 
validity of the law. In these circumstances political and administrative actions taken 
under legislative authority must be reviewed by senior judges in order to verify their 
legality. If the judges ignore the uncertainty in the rule of law they are failing to 
defend it, which is a dereliction of their constitutional duty.  
Ambiguous legislation thus negates the possibility of a ‘black-letter’ literal 
interpretation of statutory language, even for those judges personally determined to 
act restrictively. Ambiguous legislation has thrust political power on to the 
iconoclastic judges, such as Lords Denning and Reid, as much as it has empowered 
the more reluctant conservative judges, including Lord Templeman. Judges cannot 
escape the need to clarify the meaning of ambiguous legislation and their role in this 
                                               
7
 Fuller L.L. (1964) The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press) 
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respect is entirely reactive, and not ‘activist’. Indeed if a judge refused to use 
discretion in order to resolve a legislative ambiguity that would be a political act 
motivated by personal preferences. A judge therefore faces a Catch-22 situation where 
to do nothing would be to shirk a constitutional responsibility, whereas to do 
something is liable to be misconstrued as activism and may encourage criticism from 
the government and the public. 
Why then has Parliament enacted more ambiguous legislation over the last 
fifty years? There are many possible answers to this question and there is regrettably 
insufficient space here to give them a full consideration. Nevertheless the most 
probable cause has been increasing demand following the end of the Second World 
War for an expanded state focussed on service provision. The expanded size and 
responsibilities of the state have necessitated a new form of legislative authorisation 
of government action. Laws need to be flexible and enable government to respond to 
many eventualities. Thus there is a greater premium on legislation that enables 
government discretion in its implementation, and judicial discretion is an inevitable 
corollary of this development. Friedrich von Hayek and Harry Jones both anticipated 
that a state committed to its citizens’ welfare, would create tensions with individual 
liberties that would enhance the role played by judges. Carol Harlow and Richard 
Rawlings have summarised these two scholars’ positions as respectively the ‘red 
light’ and ‘green light’ positions8. Hayek’s ‘red light’ position holds that collectivist 
welfare and individual liberty are mutually exclusive goods and you must either have 
one, or neither. Jones’ ‘green light’ position was more willing to accept that an 
accommodation between individual and collective welfare was possible, albeit 
difficult. 
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 Harlow C & Rawlings R (2006) Law and Administration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 10 
The point is that statute law has increased in volume and decreased in 
specificity as a result of the demands placed on the state. Clearly there were 
ambiguous laws before 1960 – the Official Secrets Act 1911, the Public Order Act 
1936, and the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939 spring to mind – however such 
significant delegations of power from Parliament to the government were the 
exception and they have become the norm. This is key, legislation was in the past a 
means of resolving a specific problem identified in the Common Law, and 
occasionally the means to delegate some of Parliament’s sovereign power to 
government. Today legislation has become the government’s maid-of-all-work, 
passed quickly with limited Parliamentary scrutiny, to form the legal backing for an 
enormous governmental role in people’s lives. Old models of power delegation from 
Parliament in terms of principal-agent, delict-sanction, contract-property do not apply 
so clearly anymore. Power is increasingly contextual, malleable, personalised, and 
contingent. In a word power is increasingly ambiguous.  
Judicial political power is therefore a product of history and political change. 
This is the unintended politicisation of the judiciary theory, and it is important to 
consider its strengths and weaknesses. A major strength of the theory is that it avoids 
certain dangerous assumptions. Firstly, it is an institutionalist rather than a 
behaviouralist theory, which avoids the difficulties of making assumptions regarding 
the personal preferences of the judges. It is incredibly difficult to observe and measure 
the preferences of judges, and it is safer to assume that they are acting appropriately 
according to the institutional norms of their office. It is particularly problematic to 
objectively measure judicial preferences if one is expecting to observe ‘activist’9 or 
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 Dickson B ed (2007) Judicial activism in common law supreme courts pp. 366-70, and Evans M, 
McIntosh W, Lin J, & Cates C (Dec 2007) ‘Recounting the Courts? Applying Automated Content 
Analysis to Enhance Empirical Legal Research’ Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 4(4), pp.1007–
1039. 
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‘supremacist’10 behaviour. Therefore this paper links into the dominant theoretical 
inclination of modern political science by concentrating on institutional factors, rather 
than behaviouralism. The ‘behaviouralist revolution’ in politics has been shown to 
yield limited insights and the most fruitful areas of study are the institutions within 
which actors behave. Secondly as regards the judicialisation-politicisation causal 
debate; it is arguably wrong to apply to the UK, comparative causal models from 
countries with strong histories of constitutionalism. The power of British judges has 
always been subordinate to that of the political establishment as a result of 
Parliamentary Sovereignty. This theory therefore emphasises the importance of 
historic context, specifically the constitutional fact that judicial power in Britain is 
relative rather than absolute. This means that power varies, depending on the power of 
the state, of litigants, and of politics in general. Judges do not have an independent 
source of power such as a constitution to draw strength from. For example it is hard to 
deny the importance of complex cultural phenomena such as the ‘rights revolution’. 
However, all such sociological change only affected the judiciary via the medium of 
legislation, as judges in Britain did not have direct access to the ‘rights revolution’, 
but were mediated by counsel, litigants, and ultimately the law.  
The weaknesses of this paper are firstly the narrow focus on legislation when 
there are many important sources of law that influence judges’ behaviour. European 
law and the law of torts are important examples. For instance the courts have 
developed in the Common Law the politically significant torts of misfeasance in 
public office and contributory negligence, and these developments cannot be imputed 
to the language of legislation. However in terms of public law the misfeasance tort is 
used rarely by judges, and only if there is good reason why a public law remedy could 
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 Rozenburg J (1997) Trial of strength: The battle between ministers and judges over who makes the 
law (London: Richard Cohen Books). 
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not be applied. The majority of politically significant decisions are taken in public law 
procedures, and in this field primary legislation remains the dominant source of legal 
guidance for the judges, as it forms the pinnacle of the legal hierarchy. A second 
difficulty with this theory is that it relies on history and has taken an arbitrary cut-off 
point at 1960. There were hugely significant political judgements made before this 
time – Wednesbury11, Magor and St. Mellons RDC12, and Barnard v NDLB13 for 
instance. Legislation can also have a considerable time-lag, for instance the Prison 
Act 1952 was litigated in Simms forty-seven years after its enactment. Thus legislation 
passed prior to 1960 can still have a political impact on judicial decisions. However, a 
cut-off had to be chosen somewhere, firstly the 1960s saw a sudden increase in the 
volume of public law litigation, and secondly there was a renewed interest in the 
second appeal to the Lords following the 1966 Practice Direction which empowered 
the Lords to review their own decisions. These two historic developments make the 
decade a good place to start investigations. Extension of the study period to before the 
Second World War is intended for the doctorate. 
  
II: Methodology 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that legislation has become more ambiguous 
over the last fifty years (H1), an entirely new methodology has been created with the 
results representing a unique data set. The method created is a discourse analysis, 
inspired by previously successful methods used in socio-legal research. Initially the 
aim of this project had been to perform a content analysis, but this is more appropriate 
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 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation - (1948) 112 JP 55. 
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 Magor and St Mellons RDC v Newport Corpn [1952] AC 189, [1951] 2 All ER 839. 
13
 Barnard v National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 QB 18, [1953] 1 All ER 1113. 
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for unstructured content such as newspaper articles14. Law on the other hand is a 
structured language and discourse analysis has, since the 1960s, been seen as the 
superior method to measure trends and developments in the legal register.  
A discourse analysis uses a codebook of measures that seek to measure 
hypothetically important elements of language. Most such analyses have concentrated 
on the semantic and syntactical features of the language, for instance Brenda Danet 
performed a lexical study to show how different legal language is from everyday 
language15. Danet highlighted the use of common terms with uncommon meanings, 
archaisms, tautological doublets (null and void), unusual prepositional phrases, and a 
frequent use of ‘any’. Other studies have concentrated on the syntactics of legal 
language. Gustafsson for example revealed that in a sample of legal documents there 
were far more clauses per sentence than in other structured forms of language16. 
Similar syntactic studies include Butt and Castle, who have launched a campaign for 
‘plain language’ drafting of legal documents. One particular problem they highlight is 
the use of vague modal verbs such as ‘may’, which does not provide a reliable basis 
for predicting the future 17 . Further concerns are with the use of complex 
conditionals18, a high incidence of prepositional phrases19, and ‘whiz’ deletion (where 
a sentence omits the wh-words, as in ‘agreement [which is] herein obtained or 
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 Krippendorff K (1980) Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology (London: Sage 
Publications) 
15
 Danet B (1985) ‘Legal Discourse’ in van Dijk T A ed. Handbook of Discourse Analysis. Volume I, 
(London: Academic) pp. 273-291. 
16
 Anna Trosborg (1997) Rhetorical strategies in legal language: discourse analysis of statutes and 
contracts (Gunter Narr Verlag Tubingen) 
17
 Butt P & Castle R ed. (2007) Modern Legal Drafting: A Guide to Using Clearer Language 
(Cambridge: CUP) 
18
 Crystal D & Davy D (1969) Investigating English style: English language series (Harlow: 
Longmans) 
19
 Charrow R P & Charrow V R (1979). ‘Making Legal Language Understandable: A Psycholinguistic 
Study of Jury Instructions’ Columbia Law Review. 79(7), pp. 1306-1374. 
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applied’ 20 ). All of these syntactical attributes confuse meaning and are therefore 
ambiguous. 
This project is concerned with descriptive pragmatics, as well as with 
semantics and syntactics21. Pragmatics evaluates language in terms of its probable 
effects. Thus where semantic and syntactic studies measure the internal attributes of 
discourse, pragmatics studies the external impact of the language on those who use it. 
Dennis Kurzon has performed an excellent study of legal pragmatics, concentrating 
on the nature of ‘speech acts’ in legal discourse22.  
The measures developed for this discourse analysis codebook (Table 1) all 
have roots in existing scholarship, except for the identification of subjunctive 
grammar and adjectives which I have developed independently. In such a complicated 
field of study it is important to ensure that the measures work, and that they have been 
successfully used before gives them credibility. The following coding frame lists all 
the indices and how they relate to the four elements of ‘ambiguity’. Examples can be 
found in the footnotes. 
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 Danet (1985) ‘Legal Discourse’ 
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 Charles Morris developed the trinity of ‘semiotics’ as semantics, syntactics and pragmatics. 
‘Descriptive pragmatics’ was first identified by Rudolf Carnap. D Carzo and B S Jackson (1985) 
Semiotics, Law and Social Science (Liverpool: Liverpool Law Review)  
22
 Kurzon D (1986) Pragmatics and Beyond VII: 6. It is hereby performed…Explorations in Legal 
Speech Acts (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Co) 
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Table 1: Discourse analysis codebook 
Variable Linguistic problem Observable Implications 
Pluralism Syntactic ambiguity Use of the passive form23 
  Use of embeddings24 
   
Volatility Semantic ambiguity Use of subjunctive language25 
  Use of adjectives26 
   
Decentralisation Pragmatic ambiguity Use of vague modal verbs27 
  Use of enabling powers28 
  Lack of clear agency29 
   
Mobility Pragmatic ambiguity Use of conditional language30 
  Refers to other legal provisions31 
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 For instance s 25(5) Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, ‘Any proceedings from which 
persons are excluded…’ this does not clarify which agent it is that will perform the exclusion. 
24
 For example s 3(7)(a) Terrorism Act 2006, ‘…something that is likely to be understood, by any one 
or more of the persons to whom it has or may become available, as a direct or indirect encouragement 
or other inducement…’ 
25
 Subjunctive language is where the language projects a desired state of affairs, and is contrasted with 
indicative language which states how the world actually is. Such aspirational language does not lay out 
what the law is, but rather what it ought to be. For instance s 1(1) Overseas Development and Co-
Operation Act 1980, ‘The Secretary of State shall have power, for the purpose of promoting the 
development or maintaining the economy of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, or the 
welfare of its people, to furnish any person or body with assistance, whether financial, technical or of 
any other nature.’ This ambiguous section was litigated in the Pergau Dam case: R v Secretary of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs ex p World Development Movement Ltd (1995). 
26
 Adjectives are far more open to contestation than are nouns and verbs. For instance s (1) Transport 
(London) Act 1969 called for the provision of ‘economic, efficient and integrated’ transport. This 
ambiguity led to the famous ‘Fare’s Fair’ case: Bromley v Greater London Council (1983). 
27
 A vague modal verb often used in statute law is ‘may’ which does not say whether or not an action 
‘will’ or ‘shall’ be performed. It is therefore vague and leaves discretion to the agent. For instance s 
16B(1)(b) Disability Discrimination Act 1995, ‘…an application [for employment as a disabled person] 
will or may be determined to any extent…’. 
28
 Enabling powers are those that allow an agent to amend the law outside the usual procedure for 
primary legislation. This includes the power to make delegated legislation, which in its most extreme 
form is called a ‘Henry VIIIth Clause’. It also includes the discretion to change the particulars of the 
law. For instance s 71(2) Race Relations Act 1976, ‘The Secretary of State may by order impose…such 
duties as he considers appropriate for the purpose of ensuring the better performance by those persons 
of their duties…’ 
29
 In this case Parliament has failed to specify exactly which agent is responsible for the delegated 
power. For instance when ‘the Secretary of State’, or ‘Her Majesty’ appears in statutes it can represent 
any member of the government. In some cases these legal entities can empower the civil service upon 
application of the Carltona principle. 
30
 For instance s 3(3) Public Order Act 1936, ‘Any person…with intent to provoke a breach of the 
peace or whereby a breach of the peace is likely to be occasioned, shall be guilty of an offence.’ This 
section demands considerable foresight on the part of the Chief Officer of Police. One can see two very 
different interpretations of the Public Order Act emerging as a result of its contextual confusion. In 
Jordan v Burgoyne a fascist march in Trafalgar Square was deemed illegal, whereas in Brutus v Cozens, 
an anti-apartheid protest at Wimbledon, was not.  
31
 This is referential law. It means that to truly understand the law one must refer to other legal 
provisions, be they other Acts of Parliament, delegated legislation, or the legislation of a sub or supra-
national Parliament. 
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This codebook has nine measures which employ a simple binary system (0/1) 
to make a composite measure of ‘ambiguity’ for the four different categories. Due to 
the vast quantity of legislation a sample was used to make predictions about the 
overall nature of legislative language. Sections of legislation were sampled using a 
systematic sample. That is for every 19th page the first section starting after that point 
was measured against the nine indicators. A random sample was rejected as it did not 
as effectively represent the chronological range of different legislation passed in a 
year. However if a sampled page had no sections as it was a schedule, then a random 
sample of the parent Act was taken. By this means, some of the years sampled with a 
great deal of scheduled material had higher sample sizes, even if they had fewer 
sections overall than other years.  The figure 19 was chosen because in an initial pilot 
study it was shown that a sample of just over 5% of all pages of legislation would be 
the optimal sample from which to predict with 95% statistical confidence what the 
true levels of ambiguity are.  
All the primary legislation from every five years was sampled. Thus 1960, 
1965, and so on up to and including 2005, were all sampled creating a total of ten 
years. For each year a sample of just over 5% of the pages was tested using the 
codebook, which produced a total sample size (n) of 1,335 sections. Each section 
produced a series of nine binary scores that formed the four categories of ‘ambiguity’, 
giving each section a measure of how ambiguous it is in each of these parameters. An 
average was then taken for each year on each measure of ambiguity, and this sample 
average was used to calculate confidence intervals using the formula 
_
_
YzY
�� � , 
 17 
where 
n
s
Y �� _�
 (32). This formula calculates the range of values above and below 
the sample mean within which the real value lies with a 95% probability. The 
hypothesis that the language of legislation has changed since 1960 (H1) will be proved 
and the null (H0) disproved if the sample mean and the confidence intervals of the 
years after 1960, all increase beyond the upper range of the 1960 confidence interval. 
 
III: Results 
 
 The first four diagrams (Figs 1-4) show the results of the change in proportion 
of ambiguity in legislation between 1960 and 2005 for each of the four measures of 
ambiguity. Each graph has six lines. The three thin and straight lines represent the null 
hypothesis, which is the baseline level of legislative ambiguity in 1960. These lines 
represent the sample mean in the middle, flanked above and below by the confidence 
interval range. The three thicker, moving lines, show the same information for each of 
the ten years. In order to disprove the null hypothesis, these thicker lines all need to 
move above the upper range of the 1960 baseline. If the thicker lines do not leave the 
confidence range of the 1960 baseline then we cannot with 95% confidence discount 
the null hypothesis.  
 
 
 
  
                                               
32
 �_Y  The sample average. �z The test statistic. Assuming a normal distribution, where 96.1�z  
this calculates confidence to the 95% level.  
�� _Y� The standard error of the sample mean. �s The sample standard deviation. �n The sample size. 
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Figures 1-4: Display changes over time to the proportion of sections of legislation that present 
ambiguous characteristics, stated as a percentage. The four graphs represent the four parameters of 
ambiguous legislative language: plurality, volatility, decentralisation and mobility. Each graph has 
three thin straight lines representing the null hypothesis, which is the level of ambiguity in 1960. The 
lines represent the sample mean in the middle, with the upper and lower confidence interval above and 
below this. The three thicker lines represent the sample averages and confidence intervals for every 
five years up to 2005.  
Fig 3: Change in the proportion of sections displaying 
decentralised ambiguity.
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Fig 4: Change in the proportion of sections displaying 
mobile ambiguity.
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Fig 2: Change in the proportion of sections displaying 
volatile ambiguity.
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Fig 1: Change in the proportion of sections displaying 
pluralistic ambiguity.
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Figures 1-4 show that the proportion of ambiguous sections in legislation has 
changed since 1960. The thicker moving lines show an upward trend for volatility, 
decentralisation and mobility. Only in plurality was there a less decisive move away 
from the 1960 baseline (Fig 1). One possible explanation is that plurality started from 
a higher level in 1960 than all of the other measures bar mobility. Of the sampled 
sections in 1960 39% displayed aspects of pluralism of language: that is either the use 
of passive grammar that obscures agency, or the use of embedded clauses. This 
average did increase to a peak of 50% in 1995, but this is still just less than the upper 
limit of the 1960 confidence interval (51%). There is little chance that the true figure 
for 1960 is as high as 51%, however we cannot with 95% confidence reject the null 
hypothesis for plurality of language.  
Volatility on the other hand displays a much more positive rise (Fig 2), and by 
1990 the change is significant enough that even the lowest possible value for 1990 
(33%) is higher than the highest possible for 1960 (26%), thereby allowing us to 
reject the null with 95% confidence. This shows that legislative language displays a 
higher proportion of subjunctive grammar, and a greater use of adjectives. This trend 
tapers off in 2005, which could be explained by the fact that 2005 was an election 
year and there was far less legislation than for other years under New Labour. This 
change in the proportion of volatile language over the fifty year period is a very 
significant result. Where plurality measures a general lack of clarity, volatility implies 
that the language is open to dispute depending on an individual’s subjective 
standpoint. An example of such a section that was sampled is s.65(1) Environmental 
Protection Act 1990, 
 
‘(1) No information shall be included in a register maintained under section 
64 above if and so long as, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, the inclusion in 
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the register of that information, or information of that description, would be contrary 
to the interests of national security.’ 
 
This is a fine example of volatility of language as opposed to plurality. The 
sentences are short and easily comprehensible in terms of their grammar, but the true 
meaning is still unclear because it relies on what the Secretary of State believes 
‘national security’ means in any given case. Volatility is arguably far more 
problematic to the judiciary than plurality of language. It is usually possible to resolve 
grammatical confusion through application of the ‘golden rule’ of statutory 
interpretation33. However when the confusion lies in a contested concept such as 
‘national security’ the confusion is far more serious and a prospective elucidation of 
the concept would be a rational judicial strategy. Thus we can see that if a case came 
to the courts under s. 65(1) Environmental Protection Act, it would be necessary for 
the courts to define what ‘national security’ meant, and this would be a political 
decision in that it would be discretionary and have prospective importance.  
Results are also supportive for the theory in terms of decentralisation where an 
upward trend is observed which escapes the 1960 baseline for 1990 and 1995 (Fig 3). 
This also allows us to reject the null hypothesis. Decentralisation is arguably the most 
important measure, as it asks whether a section creates discretion for an unnamed 
agent to change the basic elements of the law itself. This is where one can see law that 
enables the government to act with discretion in administration, and even to change 
law without going through the rigours of the Parliamentary process.  
Figure 3 also shows a decline in the proportion of decentralising sections 
under New Labour which was unexpected. The sampled averages for 2000 and 2005 
were both 34% of legislative sections, which is considerably lower than 1990 at 46%. 
                                               
33
 Bennion F.A.R. (2002) Statutory Interpretation: A Code 4th ed (London: Butterworths) 
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New Labour enjoyed strong Commons majorities and a centralising executive, so one 
would expect higher levels of decentralisation of language. What one can say, is that 
the proportions are still worryingly high, and that the use of decentralising sections for 
New Labour included some of the most draconian legislation of recent times, such as 
the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (where 52% of the sampled 
sections displayed decentralising ambiguity). 
Finally as regards mobility, there is also an upward shift which from 1990 to 
2000 goes beyond the 1960 baseline, again allowing us to reject the null hypothesis 
(Fig 4). Mobility, like pluralism, has shown high levels throughout the period, as it 
never dropped below 41% in the sampled average. This measure looks at language 
whose meaning depends on the facts of the case, or on another piece of law. Such 
high levels of mobility show how important it is for Parliament to build flexibility into 
its legislation by allowing it to cope with eventualities, and it also shows how 
legislation is a sedimentary process that changes rapidly when new eventualities 
emerge. This again makes it difficult for a judge to identify the vires within which a 
delegate of Parliament ought to be operating and it encourages the courts to outline 
their own solution. 
The results for each of the measures have displayed the hypothesised trend 
with the exception of pluralism. Overall these results show that there has been 
deterioration in the clarity of legislative language. The results however only display a 
proportion of the legislative sections, so what happens if we look at real terms 
changes in the levels of ambiguous legislation? First of all it is important to consider 
how the volume of legislation has changed, shown in Figures 5-8. Figure 5 shows the 
total number of pages of legislation for every year between 1900 and 2006, which 
indicates an enormous increase from the lowest level of 82 pages in 1905 to an 
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astonishing 5,388 pages in 2006. The linear trend line shows a steady increase for the 
whole of the 20th Century. The subsequent three graphs illustrate legislative matters 
central to an expanding and welfare orientated state; namely criminal justice (Fig 6), 
the annual Finance Act (Fig 7), and social security (Fig 8). For these graphs the 
average page length for all statutes in every year between 1960 and 2006 was 
calculated and is represented by the thin line. The thicker line shows the number of 
pages of legislation on each of the three topics.  
It can seen from Figure 6 that the average statute length is considerably lower 
than the length of criminal law legislation for the majority of years. There is a 
significant increase after 1993 where the average statute was a considerable 69 pages, 
but the volume of criminal law was 215 pages. By far the most voluminous year was 
2003 with an enormous 949 pages of criminal and counter-terrorism law, well above 
the 99 page average for all other subjects. This shows that huge set-piece criminal 
justice laws have become increasingly important to successive governments in the 
fight against crime. A similar trend can be seen with the annual Finance Act (Fig 7) 
which peaked at 782 pages in 2000 (the average statute was 98 pages). Also in social 
security an ongoing rise can be observed (Fig 8), which peaked at an incredible 1,345 
pages in 1992.  
All of the graphs show sharp rises and falls which reveals that every few years 
a new piece of legislation is passed on each policy area. This regular legislative 
innovation could represent a change of minister, or a change in government policy; 
either way it is disturbing evidence that continuity and clarity in the law is lacking as 
law is constantly changed through vast legislative instruments. It is little wonder that 
judges are forced to establish clarity. 
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Figures 5-8: Display changes in the volume of legislation over time. Figure 5 looks at the total volume 
of legislation between 1900 and 2006, measured by total page length. Figs 6-8 display changes in the 
page length of legislation between 1960 and 2006 in three important policy areas for a service 
orientated state. The thin line represents the average page length of all legislation for each year. The 
thick line displays the length of legislation enacted in each year on the policy area of interest. 
Fig 5: Total number of pages of primary legislation 
per year, 1900-2006.
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
Year
Pa
ge
s 
o
f le
gi
sl
a
tio
n
Total Number of Pages Linear (Total Number of Pages)
Fig 6: Total page length of criminal justice and 
counter-terrorism legislation.
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Fig 7: Page length of the annual Finance Act.
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Clearly one can see that the volume of legislation has increased considerably, 
and on subjects that are liable to attract high numbers of aggrieved citizens seeking 
satisfaction in the courts. Following on from these results it is necessary to factor in 
the change in the volume of legislation as well as the change in its quality. Table 2 
shows the total number of legislative sections for each of the years and the sample 
size. If we take the proportions calculated for Figs 1-4 above and translate them into 
predicted real terms values the results are startling (Figs 9-12). Some of the years 
have more sections overall but had a lower sample size, which is because if a year had 
more schedules and thereby more pages, more of its sections were sampled. 
 
Table 2: Total number of sections enacted for each year, and sample size for each 
year. 
Year Total Sections Sections Sampled 
1960 1129 52 
1965 1608 39 
1970 1481 60 
1975 2318 95 
1980 2516 79 
1985 2976 147 
1990 1825 150 
1995 2029 170 
2000 2784 125 
2005 2380 157 
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Figures 9-12: Display changes over time to the total number of sections of legislation that present 
ambiguous characteristics. Each graph has three thin straight lines representing the null hypothesis, 
which is the level of ambiguity in 1960. The lines represent the sample mean in the middle, with the 
upper and lower confidence interval above and below this. The three thicker lines represent the sample 
averages and confidence intervals for every five years up to 2005.   
Fig 9: Change in the number of sections that contain 
pluralistic ambiguity.
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Fig 10: Change in the number of sections that contain 
volatile ambiguity.
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Fig 11: Change in the number of sections that contain 
decentralised ambiguity.
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Fig 12: Change in the number of sections that contain 
mobile ambiguity.
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The real terms increase in the number of ambiguous sections is strong 
evidence in favour of the hypothesis that legislation is more ambiguous now than it 
was in 1960. For all of the measures of ambiguity the upper limit of the 1960 baseline 
is quickly superseded by even the lowest possible limit of every year thereafter, 
allowing us to reject the null hypothesis that legislation has not changed since 1960 
with 95% confidence. What is really interesting is that in real terms the worst periods 
for ambiguity were the 1980s and 2000s, whereas when we considered proportions 
the worst period was the 1990s. This holds to reason. In the 1990s John Major had a 
small Commons majority and thus the volume of legislation he could pass was limited, 
however the legislation that was enacted was proportionately more ambiguous than 
for any other period. This suggests that Major was incentivised to limit the total 
amount of legislation, and to make that legislation which was passed of maximal 
benefit to the government. One can expect at times when the government has a 
comfortable Commons majority that it does not feel pressure to squeeze as much out 
of Parliament with every Act, as it can pass more legislation with relative ease. This 
poses an interesting prediction for forthcoming legislation under the current governing 
coalition. Parliamentary business will be considerably harder for the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat government than it was for its New Labour predecessors. Thus one 
can expect less legislation, but perhaps of a more ambiguous nature as the government 
seeks to govern with Parliament at arms-length.  
These results are preliminary, and for the doctoral thesis I intend to lengthen 
the range of the study back to before the Second World War, and I will also increase 
the sample sizes in order to tighten the confidence intervals. Then it will be necessary 
to establish the links between this deterioration in linguistic clarity and the political 
power of the judges through interviews and case studies. 
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Conclusion 
  
Considerable evidence has been brought to bear on the hypothesis: that 
legislation has become more ambiguous since 1960 (H1). It is clear from this paper 
that the institutional environment within which judges act has changed radically, and 
their role in determining the rule of law in every case brought to them is highly likely 
to have been made more difficult as a result of the increased ambiguity of legislation. 
There is thus good evidence that the unintended politicisation of the judiciary does 
help explain the changing constitutional role of judges since 1960. Clearly a great 
deal more work is needed, but this is an important first step in showing that what 
judges have anecdotally complained of regarding ambiguous legislation, is in fact a 
real pathology in British politics that has considerably worsened since 1960.  
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